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NOTES AND COMMENTS
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PRELIMINARY ORDERS OF NATIONAL LABOR
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AFTER LEEDOM v. KYNE*
With the ever-increasing importance of administrative law on the national
level, two conflicting policy considerations have vied for the attention of the
courts: (1) the desire for informality and minimization of delay and (2) the
need to protect individual rights from unrestrained administrative power.
The first contender has made itself felt through explicit prohibitions of judicial
review in statutes setting up administrative agencies, or, more frequently,
through implied prohibitions read into statutes on the basis of congressional
intent. The second has exhibited itself in the reluctance of the courts to fore-
bear review of administrative action' and in statutes such as the Administrative
Procedure Act2 which, on its face at least, appears to assure broad availability
of review of administrative decisions.3 The adjustment of these competing
policy considerations is a continually recurring problem in all fields, but it seems
of particular current interest in the field of labor-management regulation. It is
here that the subject of this comment is set: the extent to which judicial inter-
vention in or review of labor certification proceedings is available other than via
statutorily prescribed channels.4
GENERAL BACKGROUND
The availability of judicial review is not a subject which can be readily
compartmentalized, however, and a glance at its general background as it has
evolved on the federal level is an appropriate prelude to examination of the
effect of the subject upon labor administration in particular.
The orthodox view in the nineteenth century was that even in the absence
of specific statutory prohibition of judicial review the courts could not interfere
with an administrative decision unless review was particularly prescribed. Such
interference, it was felt, would lead to confusion in the management of the execu-
tive department. 5 Thus, where a widow of a naval officer was apparently
qualified to receive two pensions, the decision of the Secretary of the Navy
* 79 S.Ct. 180 (1958).
1. The general original jurisdiction of the district courts is relied upon to justify
judicial review where no provision for review is contained in the specific statutory scheme.
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising
under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against
restraints and monopolies." Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §1337 (1952).
2. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§1001-1011 (1952).
3. Administrative Procedure Act §10, 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §1009 (1952).
4. We assume in this comment that qualifications such as the prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies and standing to sue have been met. Although our inquiry in a
sense involves the question of scope of review, this issue too is ancillary to our principal and
narrow subject-matter, the presence or absence of an avenue or means of review outside
specifically prescribed statutory channels.
5. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 496 (1840) ; Hadden v. Merritt, 115 U.S. 25 (1885) ; United States ex rel. Dunlap
v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 (1888); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
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that she could accept only one of them was considered non-reviewable even
though the propriety of his decision depended upon the correctness of his inter-
pretation of a statute.6
With the twentieth century (which has seen the rapid development of the
administrative system as an alternative to the more rigid procedures of the
courts),7 the reluctance of the courts to encroach on the administrative .function
has softened to the extent that, in the view of some authorities, a rebuttable
presumption favoring reviewability presently prevails in the absence of clear
congressional intent to the contrary or overriding policy considerations mili-
tating against such review.8 American School of Magnetic Healing v. Mc-
AnnuIty,0 decided in 1902, was the leading case in this trend. There, the
Postmaster General had issued a fraud order depriving the American School
of mail privileges under iuthority of a statute which permitted such action
"upon evidence satisfactory" to the Postmaster General and neither provided
for nor expressly prohibited judicial review. The Court accepted jurisdiction
to review because the power conferred by the statute was subject to abuse of
individual rights in the absence of judicial reviewability.'0 In the previous cen-
tury, this argument had been brushed aside with the dogma that all power is
susceptible to abuse, but not necessarily subject to judicial control for that
reason alone.:"
In twentieth century litigation, where, as in the American School case,
there has been no specific provision regarding judicial review, the courts have
seemed to consider practicalities of result in determining whether or not review
would be available. Thus, two years following the American School decision,
the Supreme Court decided that the denial by the Postmaster General of a sec-
ond class mail permit would not be reviewable inasmuch as the courts would
be swamped with such appeals if it were to allow them.12 By and large, the
court's own opinion of the merits of reviewability in the particular type of
case presented has governed, and this has led to varying decisions and considera-
ble dissent in particular cases.
13
More difficulty was encountered when Congress had denominated the ad-
ministrative decision process as "final" or "final and conclusive." But this has
6. Decatur v. Paulding, supra note 5.
7. "About one-third of federal peacetime agencies were created before 1900, and
another third before 1930." DAVIS, ADM-NISTRATIVE LAW 4 (1951).
8. See Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review 1, 71 HARv. L. REV. 401, 420 (1958).
Jaffe does not include areas excluded from judicial review because of their peculiar executive
nature, primarily foreign affairs and defense functions, in this "presumptior" category.
Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review II, 71 HARv. L. REv. 769, 778 (1958).
9. 187 U.S. 94.
10. Id. at 109-110.
11. "Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised
by him, upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the
statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts ...
It is no answer, that such a power may be abused, for there is no power which is not
susceptible of abuse." Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31 (1827).
12. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 (1904).
13. DAvis, An~mISTRAmrE LAW 814 (1951).
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presented only a minor hurdle where the courts have considered review to be
desirable, the terms being variously construed, for example, as final in the ab-
sence of fraud,14 as final if valid,15 or as reducing the scope of review only.10
In one instance, indeed, a statute which used the words "final and conclusive"
was interpreted as making the administrator's decision "final, at least unless
it be wholly without evidential support or wholly dependent upon a question
of law or clearly arbitrary or capricious."' 1 Such facile interpretation of pre-
clusionary language leaves the courts with little less power of review than
that normally exercised by them in the absence of any preclusionary language
whatever. Probably the import of these varying decisions is that the courts are
loathe to deny themselves the power to review the jurisdiction of administrative
action even when it has been characterized statutorily as "final." However,
where Congress has gone further and left no doubt as to its intent to preclude,
the courts will generally respect the congressional desire,' 8 at least to the
extent that it does not cut off the possibility of raising a constitutionality chal-
lenge in the courts.19
Congress injected an uncertain element into the area by the enactment
in 1946 of the Administrative Procedure Act.20 Section 10 of that Act provides
for judicial review of "any agency action" except to the extent that such
review is precluded by statute or agency action is a matter of agency discre-
tion.21  However, there is authority for the proposition that preclusion by
14. Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890).
15. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railroad v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661 (1946). The Court
did not actually hold that review would be available wherever the administrative ruling
was invalid, but came to the same result in effect by refusing to consider the question of
power of judicial review unless it were first shown that the administrative award was
valid.
16. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946). Note at 120: "It is only orders
'within their respective jurisdictions' that are made final."
17. United States v. Williams, 278 U.S. 255, 257-258 (1929).
18. See, e.g., Barnett v. Hines, 105 F.2d 96 (D.C.Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
573 (1939); United States ex rel. Farmer v. Thompson, 203 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1953);
Killian v. United States, 105 Ct.CI. 393, 63 F.Supp. 748 (1946). The statute involved in
the foregoing cases provided that "[a]ll decisions rendered by the Administrator . . . shall
be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other official or court
of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review by mandamus or otherwise any
such decision." Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 3, Tit. I, §5, 48 STAT. 9 (now Act of Sept. 2,
1958, 38 U.S.C.A. §211). The courts have not necessarily felt themselves restricted by
explicit language, however. See, e.g., Siegel v. United States, 87 F.Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y.
1949), where the court refused to review the merits but ordered a rehearing by the ad-
ministrative agency.
19. Some cases have suggested that judicial review is constitutionally required. Note,
for example, St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936), Brandeis,
J. (concurring opinion): "The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity
to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether
the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly." Mr. Justice
Frankfurter argues that judicial review should be required under a proper interpretation
of the Constitution only in "rare instances." Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 312 (1944)
(dissenting opinion). See cases cited, infra note 45. Also see DAvis, AnM sTwAnv LAW
856-865 (1951).
20. Supra note 1.
21. Supra note 2. Section 10 reads as follows:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion.
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statute includes preclusion resulting from the interpretation of congressional in-
tent where the particular statute is silent as to whether judicial review is to be
available.22 This viewpoint has been contested by some who understand the
Act as not being simply declaratory of the law which had existed prior to
its enactment but as extending judicial review in all cases where Congress has
not specifically proscribed it.23 Although it appears that the Supreme Court
may incline toward this view,2 4 the Court has not decided that only explicit
preclusion within the statute involved will effectively bring the exception of
section 10 into play. A generally held opinion is that the effect of section 10
is to make the mere fact that provisions for review are not included in a statutory
plan, standing alone, insufficient to justify the inference that Congress meant
to preclude judicial review.25
Thus, the availability of review is still apparently a matter of statutory
interpretation, and the major area of dispute is largely the interpretation of
congressional silence. This is particularly so in the politically explosive field
of labor legislation where the statutory product is often the somewhat ambigu-
ous result of compromise.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
The main features of federal labor regulation are presently encompassed
in two statutes, the Railway Labor Act 26 (applying generally in the transporta-
tion field) and the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) ,27 the
(a) Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any
relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof....
22. Kirdand v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co., 167 F.2d 529 (D.C.Cir. 1948);
Olin Industries v. National Labor Relations Board, 72 F.Supp. 225 (D.C.Mass. 1947).
23. American President -Lines v. Federal Maritime Board, 112 F.Supp. 346, 349
(D.D.C. 1953), Holtzoff, D.J.: "1... The Administrative Procedure Act is no mere codifica-
tion of pre-existing law. If that were all that was accomplished by the enactment of this
far-reaching statute, the prodigious labor that had been put into it, would have gone
for naught."
24. In Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956), the Court permitted the review
of an exclusion order (directed against an alien seeking entry into the country) under
and by virtue of the Administrative Procedure Act, although prior thereto, such an
order could only be reviewed by a habeas corpus proceeding after the individual was in
custody. The statute provided that the administrative decision was to be "final," but this
was not a sufficiently explicit preclusion direction on the part of Congress to make the
section 10 exception in the Act applicable.
25. This view did not emanate from section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, but was set forth by the Supreme Court in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
See also Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120 (1946). In Air Line Dispatchers
Association v. National Mediation Board, 189 F.2d 685, 688-89 (D.C.Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, though recognizing
that preclusion, as referred to in section 10, might be accomplished either expressly or by
judicial interpretation, suggested that statutory interpretation in areas not theretofore ad-
judicated must be approached differently in light of the general policy favoring review
in the Administrative Procedure Act. For full discussion of the Act, see Schwartz, The
Administrative Procedure Act in Operation, 29 N.Y.U.L.REv. 1173, 1237 (1954); Jaffe,
The Right to Judicial Review I1, 71 HARv. L. REv. 769, 790 (1958).
26. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§151-188 (1952).
27. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§141-188 (1952), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§154,
172, 178, 188 (Supp. V 1958).
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successor of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act),2s applying pri-
marily in the non-transportation interstate industries.
The Railway Labor Act was enacted in 1926 as a result of general dissatis-
faction with Title III of the Transportation Act of 192029 which had sought
to deal with the problem of strikes of carriers' employees. That statute had
been grounded entirely upon voluntary mediation, the Railway Labor Board,
which was established thereunder, having no sanctions of enforcement other
than the rather uncertain effect of bringing adverse public opinion to bear
upon parties who did not abide by the spirit of the statute.30 By contrast, the
1926 statute, operating through two boards, imposed limited coercive sanc-
tions31 and recognized the right of employees to designate representatives by
majority choice without the intervening interference, influence, or coercion of
employers.3 2 Although the statute did not provide any internal method of
enforcement of the restrictions against the employer's interference, the in-
junctive process was made available by the courts for this purpose.3 3 In 1934,
the Act was amended to provide for certification of majority bargaining repre-
sentatives by the National Mediation Board so as to avoid the deadlock of col-
lective bargaining by jurisdictional disputes between unions and also to im-
pose a duty on the employer to "treat with" the so-certified representative. 4
This, too, was enforced by injunctive relief.35
The Wagner Act (now the Taft-Hartley Act), which became law in 1935,
followed the certification procedure of the Railway Labor Act closely, but went
further to provide for limited judicial review. Section 8 of the Act characterized
certain acts as unfair labor practices and section 10 empowered the Board to
issue cease and desist orders enjoining unfair labor practices, permitting judicial
review of such orders in a federal Court of Appeals. 0 Preliminary orders,
28. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 STAT. 449 (1935).
29. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, Tit. III, 41 STAT. 456, 469.
30. Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. United States Railroad Labor Board, 261 U.S.
72, 79 (1923).
31. Under section 9 of the Act, means of enforcement of arbitration awards were
provided; under section 10, a thirty-day waiting period could be imposed, where a con-
troversy had not been submitted to arbitration, by the appointment of an emergency board
by the President to investigate the dispute. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, §§9, 10, 44 STAT.
585, 586 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§159, 160 (1952).
32. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, §2 Third, 44 STAT. 577, 45 U.S.C. §152 Third (1952).
33. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship
Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
34. Railway Labor Act, ch. 691, §2 Ninth, 48 STAT. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §152
Ninth (1952).
35. Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
36. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, Tit. I, §10(e) and (f), 61 STAT. 147-48
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §160(e) and (f) (1952) provides:
(e) The Board shall have power to petition any United States Court of
Appeals . . .for the enforcement of such order [to cease and desist from the
commission of unfair labor practices] and for appropriate temporary relief or
restraining order. ...
(f) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or
denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such
order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair
labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein
such person resides or transacts business. . . .
376
NOTES AND COMMENTS
including primarily those issued in the course of certification proceedings under
section 9, are not reviewable under the Act except that under section 9(d),
where a cease and desist order has been made the subject of review in the Court
of Appeals, any certification proceedings preliminary to the unfair labor prac-
tice action are made a part of the record on review and thereby subjected to
judicial scrutiny.
37
A strong inference from rather plain legislative history suggests that re-
view was not intended to be available directly from the certification finding,
since Congress, when considering the Wagner Act, had before it the experience
of an earlier short-lived experiment under Public Resolution #44, promul-
gated under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1934.38 That resolution
had permitted direct judicial review of certification proceedings in labor dis-
putes, with the result that efforts to certify representatives and get the bar-
gaining process going were readily thwarted by the employer's taking of any
certification to court for review.3 9 Even though he lost in court, he could
reap the interim benefits of delay in his local fight with the union.
Thus, the Supreme Court found no difficulty in determining that the statu-
tory appeal to the Court of Appeals from the Board was available only from
unfair labor practice findings.40 A more difficult problem was presented, how-
ever, as to whether the district courts, in the exercise of their general equity
powers and extraordinary remedies,41 could review certification action under
the Railway Labor Act, which was completely silent concerning judicial review,
or under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, which provided for judicial review
only with respect to unfair labor practice orders.
NONSTATUTORY REVIEW oF ADMINIsTRATIvE DECISIONS rN LABOR CASES
The question whether the general powers of the district courts could be
invoked in connection with labor legislation without specific legislative authority
first arose in connection with the failure of the Railway Labor Act to provide
means of enforcement of the duties thereunder. Texas & New Orleans Railroad
Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks42 is the first important
37. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, Tit. I, §9(d), 61 STAT. 144 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §159(d) (1952).
38. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 STAT. 195. See references to committee reports
regarding Public Resolution 44 in American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 308 U.S. 401, 410 (1940).
39. American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, supra note 38,
at 409.
40. American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, 308 U.S. 401
(1940).
41. Supra note 1. Customarily the court's power in equity is appealed to as well as
the Declaratory judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§2201-2202 (1952). It has been held, however,
that the Declaratory judgment procedure does not enlarge the court's equity power of
review and its use thus has no particular significance. Bradley Lumber Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 84 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 559 (1936).
Inland Empire District Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945), was a case involving the
alternative pleading of the Declaratory judgment form of relief, without special significance
being attached thereto.
42. Supra note 33.
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case for our purposes. There, the Supreme Court sustained an injunction
restraining an employer from "interfering with, influencing or coercing the
clerical employees of the Railroad Company in the matter of their organization
and designation of representatives. '43 The fact that the Act had not provided
a penalty was not deemed controlling, it being sufficient that a specific legal
right had been created-the right to organize. As the prohibition was capable
of enforcement by the use of the general powers of the courts, particularly the
injunctive power, and as the obvious intent of Congress to prohibit would be
meaningless if no enforcement were allowed, the courts asserted power under
their general equity jurisdiction to command obedience. Similarly, after the
1934 amendment imposing the duty to bargain upon the employer, the absence
of any specific statutory relief was remedied by means of the mandatory in-
junction.44
A different result obtained in 1943, however, in Switchmen's Union of
North America v. National Mediation Board.45 Two unions competed for
certification as bargaining representatives for the New York Central System,
one, the Switchmen's Union, desiring to represent the employees on certain geo-
graphical segments of the system only while the other sought to have the Board
find a bargaining unit encompassing the entire system appropriate. The Board
ruled that it did not have the power under the Railway Labor Act to split
the system into more than one bargaining unit and accordingly certified the
latter union after an appropriate system-wide election. The Switchmen, claim-
ing the Board's interpretation of its statutory power to be mistaken in law, sued
for an injunction. The lower courts affirmed the Board on the merits,40 but the
Supreme Court, in a carefully written opinion, rejected jurisdiction. Congress
had carefully surrounded the Board with protective devices to prevent the
sterility of action that had occurred under the Railway Act's predecessor and
clearly intended that the parties be brought into negotiation as quickly as
possible so as to further the aims of the Act, voluntary settlement of labor
disputes without disrupting strikes. The cases in the thirties that had permitted
injunction to enforce duties under the Act 47 were not apropos. There, no relief
had been available under the Act, and failure to permit injunctive relief would
have resulted in the complete sacrifice of legally created rights. Here, on the
other hand, Congress had created a right, representation by majority will, and
provided an appropriate remedy, certification by the Board after full investi-
gation of what the majority of the employees desired. Interference by the courts
would not serve to preserve a legally protected right which would otherwise be
lost.
43. Id. at 555.
44. Supra note 35.
45. 320 U.S. 297.
46. Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 135 F.2d 785
(D.C.Cir. 1943).
47. Texas and New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship
Clerks, supra note 33; Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, supra note 35.
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All constitutional questions aside, it is for Congress to determine
how the rights which it creates shall be enforced .... In such a case
the specification of one remedy normally excludes another....48
The interpretation of the Switchmen's case by the lower courts varied.
Some authority held that the case precluded review by the district courts unless
constitutional issues were presented, in which case, so long as the constitutional
issues alleged were not "transparently frivolous" or "plainly untenable", juris-
diction was acquired for consideration by the court of all questions, even the
ones not grounded on constitutional rights.49 Others interpreted the decision
as being restricted to Board handling of jurisdictional disputes between com-
peting unions, with problems other than those left open for future considera-
tion.50 Where the problem presented was one of jurisdictional power or duty
of the Board to act, injunctive relief might yet be obtained in the district
court.51
The Supreme Court avoided making any definite decision on the question
of the availability of the equity powers of the district courts to appeal from
certification proceedings under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, however,
until fifteen years after the Switchnen's decision. The question had been
expressly reserved in a 1940 case until a proper record was presented "showing
... that unlawful action of the Board [had] inflicted an injury.., for which
the law, apart from the review provisions of the Wagner Act, [would afford] a
remedy.152 Five years later, the Court, following this dictum, exhibited the
somewhat curious approach, in a case directly presenting the question whether
jurisdiction was present in the district court to enjoin Board action, of first
determining the merits of the complaint against the Board action in order to
determine whether or not the required unlawful action and resultant injury
were present so as to permit a decision concerning the jurisdiction of the court
to review the merits of the Board action at all.5 3 Finding that, in fact, the
Board had not acted unlawfully, the Court did not answer the question of
judicial power to examine the propriety of the Board action.
Lacking any compelling lead from the Supreme Court, the lower courts
diverged in their handling of the cases under Wagner and Taft Act circum-
stances. Some authority considered the area to be governed by the Switch-
48. Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297,
301 (1943).
49. Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir. 1949); Worthington Pump and Machin-
ery Corp. v. Douds, 97 F.Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
50. Airline Dispatcher's Association v. National Mediation Board, 189 F.2d 685,
687-88 (D.C.Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
51. Ibid. See also Farmer v. United Electrical Workers, 211 F.2d 36 (D.C.Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954).
52. American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, 308 U.S. 401,
412 (1940).
53. Inland Empire District Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945). The Court held
that the jurisdiction of the district court to review should not be determined "in the
absence of some showing that the Board has acted unlawfully . .. whether by way of
departure from statutory requirements or from those of due process of law." 325 U.S.
at 700.
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men's preclusion of district court review,5 4 while another line of cases seemed
to follow a more liberal trend in the wake of the Inland decision,', permitting
district court action where the Board had acted outside of its lawful jurisdiction
or in a manner contrary to the statute under which the Board operated.50
Some of the cases viewed the problem as, to a great extent, one of exhaustion
of administrative remedies and of prematurity of suit,57 arguing that the merely
preliminary procedures of the representation proceeding action under section
9 of the Act were not conclusive and could not in their nature deprive any party
of rights. The major premise of this argument was that only after a petition
for enforcement or review of a cease and desist order, rendered at the conclu-
sion of an unfair labor practice hearing, had been submitted to and decided by
a Court of Appeals could an enforceable duty against a party exist, from the
violation of which it might incur sanctions. Since, under section 9(d) of the
Act, the representation proceeding actions would be part of the reviewable
record in the subsequent unfair labor practice enforcement proceeding, judicial
review would, in due course, be obtained. The fallacy in this analysis was
three-fold: (1) it assumed that substantial rights could not be adversely affected
by the mere declaration of duties by the Board, even though not immediately
enforceable; 58 (2) it assumed that, as a practical matter, review under sec-
tion 10 of the Act would be, in due course, available to parties prejudiced in
the representation phase of labor administration; and (3) perhaps most sig-
nificantly, it assumed that some sort of review was required for disappointed
parties before the Board.59
54. Milis v. Inland Empire District Council, 144 F.2d 539 (D.C.Cir. 1944), afl'd,
325 U.S. 697 (1945); Madden v. Brotherhood and Union of Transit Employees, 147 F.2d
439, 444 (4th Cir. 1945); Fitzgerald v. Douds, 167 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1948).
55. Supra note 53.
56. Airline Dispatchers Association v. National Labor Relations Board, 189 F.2d 685
(D.C.Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951); Farmer v. United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America, 211 F.2d 36 (D.C.Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943
(1954). See DePratter v. Farmer, 232 F.2d 74 (D.C.Cir. 1956) (jurisdiction denied be-
cause of lack of showing that Board action was unlawful).
57. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, 303 U.S. 41 (1937), an
action to enjoin the holding of a hearing by the N.L.R.B., particularly at 50-52. Also
see Zimmer-Thomson Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 60 F.Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y.
1945). Compare Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers, Inc. v. National War Labor
Board, 143 F.2d 145 (D.C.Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944).
58. The Supreme Court recognized this fallacy in American Federation of Labor v.
National Labor Relations Board, 308 U.S. 401, 408 (1940), Stone, J.: "In analyzing the
provisions of the statute in order to ascertain its true meaning, we attribute little impor-
tance to the fact that the certification does not itself command action. Administrative
determinations which are not commands may for all practical purposes determine rights
as effectively as the judgment of a court, and may be reexamined by courts under particular
statutes providing for the review of 'orders.'"
59. The Supreme Court did not presume in Switchmen's (supra note 45) that judicial
review was necessary. It was sufficient that a forum was available for the enforcement
of the statutory right even though it was an administrative forum. The Fourth Circuit,
applying the Switchmen's decision to the Wagner Act cases in Madden v. Brotherhood and
Union of Transit Employees (supra note 54), quoted approvingly the testimony of the
Solicitor General before a congressional committee considering an amendment to the Wagner
Act which would have explicitly allowed for review of certification proceedings: "It is
better to suffer dissatisfaction with some unit determinations, than to have each bound
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The practical difficulties presented to a party disappointed in a certifica-
tion proceeding had been evident in the Switchmen's situation. With no
right to appeal from the Mediation Board's certification of the opposing union,
the Switchmen's Union had no choice but to await an opportunity to intervene
in a suit between the certified union and the employer to contest the propriety
of the certification. But it had no power to bring about such litigation, and,
assuming that the employer complied with its duty to "treat with" the certified
union, or if it did not, that the certified union relied upon economic pressure
to force such bargaining rather than the bringing of a suit in court for that
purpose, no opportunity would present itself for the review of the Switchmen's
grievance. The same situation presents itself under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act; unless the employer or the certified union were so inclined and were
able to induce the General Counsel of the Board to issue a complaint for an
unfair labor practice and a cease and desist order were ultimately issued, the
opportunity for review under section 10 would not present itself. Under
Switchmen's, the answer had been that this was a choice of policy on the part
of Congress in favor of expeditious commencement of the bargaining process
by the uninterrupted completion of certification; judicial review was precluded
unless it could be legally accomplished after the election had been held and
bargaining had commenced.
The Supreme Court finally dealt with the question under the National
Labor Relations Act in Leedom v. Kyne, 60 decided in 1958. There, the Board
had found a bargaining unit appropriate which included 233 professional en-
gineers and nine non-professionals, who, as the Board found, shared "a close
community of employment interest" with the professionals.0 ' This was in
accord with the practice of the Board where such inclusion would not destroy the
"predominantly professional character of such a unit." 62 However, it appeared
to violate section 9(b) (1) of the Taft-Hartley Act which prohibited such
inclusion without the prior approval of a majority of the professionals,63 which
the Board did not obtain in this instance, in accordance with its interpretation
of this restriction as applying only where professional employees would be in
up in long drawn-out litigation easily initiated by rival or minority groups." (147 F.2d
at 444.) Also see supra note 19.
60. 79 S.Ct. 180 (1958).
61. The job classifications of the non-professionals were "Engineer Order Service,"
"Engineer Test Record," and "Engineer Contact" respectively, each position being inti-
mately connected with the work of the professionals. Western Electric Corporation, 115
N.L.R.B. 1420, 1423 (1956).
62. Id. at 1424. The Board has devised these criteria as a qualification of §9(b)(1)
of the Taft-Hartley Act (infra note 63). See, e.g., Federal Telecommunications Labora-
tories, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1395, 1398 (1951); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 591,
594 (1948); Continental Motors Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 345, 347 (1948).
63. "The Board shall decide in each case whether . . . the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof; Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appro-
priate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees
who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote
for inclusion in such unit .... " Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, Tit. I, §9(b) (1),
61 STAT. 143, 29 U.S.C. §159(b)(1) (1952).
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the minority in any such unit, since only then would the professional employees
be injured by inclusion of the others in the unit.
After the election and certification of the union, the president, in both his
individual and his representative capacities, brought this suit in the district
court to set aside the Board unit determination. The Supreme Court held
that the district court had had jurisdiction to set aside the unit determination
inasmuch as the Board action was made "in excess of its delegated powers and
contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act"64 and was "plainly" unlawful.65
It distinguished Switchmen's by holding the instant case to fall within the
category of the Texas66 and Virginian67 cases of the 1930's, which had been
distinguished in the Switchmen's opinion as instances where absence of judicial
jurisdiction would entail "a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress"
had given and for which no other remedy would be available. Here, in the
majority's view, there were "no other means" than the instant suit within the
control of the petitioner to protect the right created by statute to have the
approval of the professional employees for inclusion of others in the same
unit.
However, as the dissent points out,68 the distinction of Kyne from Switch-
men's and the comparison between Kyne and the Texas and Virginian cases
is of dubious validity. The Switchmen's case had held that as long as a forum,
the National Mediation Board, was available for the enforcement of the right
of majority representation, it did not matter that no review from the determina-
tion of that Board was available, even though the alleged error of the Board
in that instance emanated from a misinterpretation of law as to its power to
act in a certain manner. In the Texas and Virginian cases, it was the absence
of any forum other than the courts in which to enforce the statutory rights
(self-organization without employer interference in Texas, the duty of the
employer to bargain in Virginian) which impelled the Court to permit the use
of general judicial remedies. The similarities between Switchmen's and Kyne
are more discernible than the differences. In both, the appropriateness of a
unit determination preparatory to certification of a bargaining representative
was involved. In both, the error of the Board was alleged to have emanated
from an erroneous interpretation of statute on its part. In both, the practical
inadequacy of normally available appellate review, in the absence of district
court review of the certification, was pleaded as justifying allowance of equitable
interference by the district courts. The difference in result appears not to be
derived from any valid distinction in the cases presented, but from the different
inference drawn in the later decision from the lack of specific statutory provi-
sion for direct review of representation questions. In Switchmen's, such silence
64. Leedom v. Kyne, 79 S.Ct. 180, 184 (1958).
65. Ibid.
66. Supra note 33.
67. Supra note 35.
68. Leedom v. Kyne, 79 S.Ct. 180, 185-91 (1958).
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on the part of Congress was interpreted to preclude interference; in Kyne,
review was to be permitted unless specific statutory provisions prevented it.
The dissent saw this change introduced by the majority as opening a
"gaping hole in the congressional wall against direct resort to the courts" 69
which would permit "the ingenuity of counsel" 70 to avoid any restrictions there-
tofore imposed against direct, and dilatory, review of representation proceed-
ings. Although the majority seemed to restrict review to situations where the
Board had violated clear statutory rules, an examination is appropriate to
determine if the effect of the decision is indeed that restrictive.
The Court of Appeals, in arriving at the same conclusion as the Supreme
Court, had placed some emphasis upon the practical inadequacy of section 10
review. The union, desiring to represent only professional employees, was
hardly in a position to instigate review, if not by direct challenge in the district
court. It could not do so by refusing to bargain with the employer, a step
which would have permitted a complaint by the employer to the Board for
the unfair labor practice thereby committed and possibly a cease and desist
order from the Board which would have opened the door to appellate review.
The employer would be more inclined to deal directly with the unrepresented
employees individually. Nor could the employees themselves be relied upon to
force review if such a step were taken. They would hardly favor compelling an
unwilling union to represent their employment interests.7
1
The Supreme Court, discussing this element as a justification for its hold-
ing, introduced the criterion whether or not review under the statute was "within
the control" of the injured party.72 A fair interpretation of the majority opinion
probably is that although mere inadequacy of review under section 10 would
not be enough to justify district court review in and of itself,73 the presence of
the factor of illegality of the Board action under the statute will provide the
necessary additional element for district court jurisdiction. Essentially, though
the Court leaves the impression that inadequacy of section 10 review in this
situation is one of the reasons for finding district court jurisdiction, the rule
seems to be simply that the district courts may not review Board action when
the Board was correct or the matter was purely one of administrative discre-
tion, but may review if the Board was wrong.74 Adequacy or inadequacy of
review plays little if any part, as review is never adequate under the modem
labor statutes, if by "adequate" one means that it is "within the control" of the
party concerned.
75
69. Id. at 187.
70. Ibid.
71. Leedom v. Kyne, 249 F.2d 490, 492 (D.C.Cir. 1957).
72. Supra note 67 at 185.
73. See, e.g., Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320
U.S. 297 (1943); Norris, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, et al., 177 F.2d 26
(D.C.Cir. 1949).
74. It is noteworthy that the Court continues the "cart before the horse" approach
used in Inland, supra note 53, of determining first the merits (in order to find illegality)
and then finding jurisdiction to review.
75. The Board cannot issue an order concerning alleged unfair labor practices until
383
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The effect of the Kyne decision seems to be to adopt a jurisdictional test
which permits immediate review by the district courts without waiting for any
statutory review procedures which might prove available under section 10, but
to apply that jurisdictional test in the most broadly encompassing manner.
The inadequacy of this test arises from *the basic difficulty of limiting the
standard to any ascertainable extent, since the basic criterion which is applied,
the presence or absence of an "unlawful act" of the Board, is fundamentally
ambiguous; the definition of what amounts to such an "unlawful act" will be
determinative of the practical effect which the decision will have in the review-
ability of Board decisions in the labor field.
Certain provisions of the Act would seem clearly adaptable as bases for
challenges similar to that in Kyne. Section 9(b), in addition to prohibiting
the Board from finding a unit appropriate which includes both professional
and non-professional employees, forbids decisions that any craft is inappropri-
ate on the basis that a different unit has been established by prior Board deter-
minations (unless the proper consent is obtained) and deciding that any unit
is appropriate which includes guards together with other employees. Not so
clear, but nonetheless possible sources of challenge, are other commanding
words throughout the section governing the conduct of representation proceed-
ings generally, requiring that the Board "shall investigate" when presented
with petitions from specified persons and with specified allegations, that regu-
lations and rules be applied impartially, that no election be held within a year
of a prior election, and so on. That the problem is not simply one of interpreta-
tion of plain statutory language, however, is indicated by the difficulty which
the Supreme Court itself has had in the interpretation of language no less plain
than the statutory prohibition in Kyne-for example, the various interpretations
which have been assigned to "final," "final and conclusive," et cetera, and the
disagreement among the justices as to what these "plain" words meant.
The present posture of the law of judicial review can be more readily
assessed, however, in the light of two lines of authority in the labor field itself,
which, though not considered by the Supreme Court in their jurisdictional sig-
nificance, are intimately connected with the problem presented by the Kyne
decision.
In Farmer v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,70 the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit was presented with a test of the
power of the Board to demand additional affidavits of union officers reaffirming
their previously filed non-communist oaths, with the threat of de-compliance
by Board order if their reaffirming affidavits were not duly filed. Evidence of
the General Counsel issues a complaint, and the General Counsel has discretion to issue
or decline to issue a complaint. Hourihan v. National Labor Relations Board, 201 F.2d
187 (D.C.Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 930 (1953), rehearing denied, 345 U.S. 961
(1953), rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 843 (1953), rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 880 (1953),
rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 917 (1953); National Labor Relations Board v. Lewis, 249 F.2d
832 (9th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 10 (1958).
76. Supra note 56.
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the falsity of the previously filed oaths had arisen in connection with an investi-
gation by a federal grand jury. The district court injunction restraining
the Board from requiring the additional affidavits during the period for which
the original affidavits had been filed was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on
the ground that investigation of the truth or falsity of affidavits filed with the
Board were within the province of the Attorney General only and that it would
be unfair to the members of the union to deprive them of Board privileges (as
would be the result of an order of de-compliance) because of the culpability of
their officers. The case was again presented on a record showing knowledge on
the part of the members of the falsity of the previously submitted affidavits,
but the Court of Appeals again held that the verity of the affidavits was with-
out the Board's province.7 7 A subsequent case, Leedom v. International Union
of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers,7 8 involving the same problem and decided
by the Court of Appeals 79 in accord with the United Electrical Workers deci-
sion,80 reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the district court's injunctive
award, without, however, considering the question of the jurisdiction of the
district court. The Court held that the Board's function was of a purely minis-
terial nature, to determine whether the required affidavits had been filed. It was
up to the Attorney General to inquire into the truthfulness of the affidavits and
to take action where perjury was indicated.
Here, there was no "specific prohibition" as the Kyne case later implied
to be necessary. Rather, the reliance in these cases had been upon the fact that
there was no statutory authority specifically permitting the Board to take such
action. And the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers decision can be further criti-
cized in that its conclusion of a clear congressional intent dictating the deci-
sion reached is at least questionable. Section 9(h) of the Act8l provides that
the Board shall not take any action on behalf of any labor union which has not
filed the required non-communist affidavits. Congress had carefully refrained,
after due consideration, from requiring the Board to inquire into the truthful-
ness of the affidavits so filed because of the delay that requirement would
necessarily impose in the handling of certification petitions and unfair labor
practice charges.8 2 But, although the primary responsibility for inquiring into
the truthfulness of the affidavits was left to the penal procedures of the De-
partment of Justice, it is not crystal clear that the Board was forbidden from
considering the truthfulness of affidavits when it desired to do so; at least, it
was not thus clear until after the Supreme Court had rendered the decision.
83
77. 221 F.2d 862 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
78. 352 U.S. 145 (1956).
79. 226 F.2d 780 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
80. Supra note 56.
81. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, Tit. I, §9(h), 61 STAT. 146, 29 U.S.C.
§159(h) (1952).
82. See Leedom v. International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, 352 U.S.
149, 149-50 (1956), for applicable legislative history.
83. The Sixth Circuit held in National Labor Relations Board v. Lannom Manufac-
turing Company, 226 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1955), that it was open to the Court to determine
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The other Supreme Court decision useful for comparison here is Hotel
Employees v. Leedom,84 decided shortly before the Kyne decision, also involv-
ing a review of an injunction proceeding against the Board without considera-
tion of the district court's jurisdiction. The Board had frequently during its
history declined to assume jurisdiction of cases even though they were admit-
tedly subject to the Taft-Hartley Act on the ground that exercise of jurisdiction
in a given case would not further the purposes of the Act because of the rela-
tively insignificant effect of the situation presented upon interstate com-
merce.85 This practice of selectivity on the part of the Board, dictated by
practical considerations, such as lack of funds or sufficient personnel, has been
recognized by the courts on several occasions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
held early in 1957 that refusal to consider a petition for representation solely
on the basis of the fact that a particular class of employment or industry was
involved was arbitrary and capricious; selectivity could be exercised only on
the basis of ad hoc decision on the particular case presented.8 6 The case here
involved was brought under section 10 of the Taft-Hartley Act and thus pre-
sented no jurisdictional questions. Nonetheless, the Hotel Employees case had
been brought in the district court just prior to the Supreme Court decision in
the section 10 controversy. The district court accepted jurisdiction but rendered
summary judgment for the Board on the merits, finding that the selectivity on
the basis of an entire industry (the hotel industry) was not arbitrary and ca-
pricious due to the essentially local effect which hotel management induced.8 7
This decision reached the Supreme Court and was reversed on the merits on
the authority of the prior holding.
88
Since the petitioner in this case had alleged both violations of the Consti-
tution and of the statute, it is impossible to determine upon what ground juris-
diction of the district court was placed. However, in view of the fact that all
three of the representative cases, Kyne, International Union, and Hotel Em-
ployees, had come from the District of Columbia Circuit which had not adopted
the views expressed elsewhere that extra-statutory review was restricted to
cases involving constitutional issues89 and that neither the International Union
whether the non-communist oaths were true or perjured in considering whether or not to
grant the petition (under §10 of the Taft-Hartley Act) of the National Labor Relations
Board for enforcement of a cease and desist order directed to an employer. Although this
case was subsequently reversed [sub nom. Amnalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
of North America, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board, 352 U.S. 153 (1956)],
it demonstrates at least reasonable doubt as to what the proper interpretation of the con-
gressional intent was at the time the principal case was before the Board. See also,
National Labor Relations Board v. Sharples Chemicals, Inc., 209 F.2d 645, 650 (6th Cir.
1954).
84. 79 S.Ct. 150 (1958).
85. National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Coun-
cil, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951); Checker Cab Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 683 (1954); Hotel Associa-
tion of St. Louis, 92 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1951).
86. Office Employees International Union v. National Labor Relations Board, 353
U.S. 313 (1957).
87. Hotel Employees v. Leedom, 147 F.Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd per curian,
249 F.2d 506 (D.C.Cir. 1957).
88. Supra note 84.
89. Supra note 49.
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nor the Kyne decision had constitutional issues, it would not appear that the
constitutional allegations here were essential to the court's jurisdiction.
The Hotel Employees decision suggests two possibilities, although it is
perhaps dangerous to attempt to read too much into a cursory per curiam
opinion such as it is. In the first place, as indicated in the section 10 case on
the authority of which this decision was decided, a criterion utilized in determin-
ing illegality of Board action may be its arbitrariness,90 and this criterion is
probably no less a ground where review is sought under the equity powers
of the district courts. Secondly, it is possible that Hotel Employees stands for
the proposition that the Court will consider plain illegality present on the basis
of a prior case holding settling the question and not just on the basis of the
words on the face of the statute. This says no more, of course, than that a
statute says what the Court says it says, and is perhaps too obvious to be men-
tioned. Moreover, the prior Supreme Court decision had not been handed
down at the time the Board rendered its opinion. Of greatest interest to our
inquiry is the possibility, clearly suggested in this case, that, in the absence of
any specific expression of intent in the statute restricting the manner in which
exercise of jurisdiction is to be accomplished by the Board, any requirement
of illegality of Board action may be satisfied if arbitrary and capricious action
is established.
Unlike Hotel Employees, the International Union decision operates purely
on the question of statutory power to act rather than on constitutional re-
strictions. However, both cases share a basic similarity in that they relate to
the exercise or the refusal of exercise of jurisdiction by the Board and in that
in neither case was there an effective mode of appeal otherwise available than
by district court action. This is patent in Hotel Employees; in International
Union, it is no less real. If the required re-affirmations had been supplied,
there would have been no opportunity to review by virtue of the question being
moot; on the other hand, refusal to supply them would bar the processes of
the Board in any future action.9 1 What is important, however, is that, even
assuming that these cases might validly be justified upon a restricted concept
of jurisdiction, distinguishable from Switchmen's by the presence of questions
not within the purview of certification proceedings per se, the alleged illegality
of Board action (indicated in the lower court opinions as being prerequisite to
district court jurisdiction in line with the dictum in Inland Empire&2 ) was
found not in the violation of a "specific statutory prohibition" but in an in-
articulate prohibition discerned by the Court from an examination of legisla-
tive history.
The treatment of illegality, impliedly given in the prior cases, lends con-
90. "We therefore conclude that the Board's declination of jurisdiction was contrary
to the intent of Congress, was arbitrary, and was beyond its power." Office Employees v.
National Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 313, 320 (1957).
91. The alternative to refusal to file the affidavit confirming the original oaths was
to be an order of de-compliance. Leedom v. International Union of Mine, Mill, and
Smelter Workers, supra note 68 at 146-47.
92. Supra note 53.
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siderable weight to the conclusion that the "specific" prohibition required by
the Court in Kyne need not unduly restrict the district courts in interfering
with the administrative process, especially when one considers that even in
Kyne, more than one interpretation of the "specific" prohibition might reason-
ably have been arrived at.93 Since the majority sought to categorize Kyne as
a jurisdictional case where failure of the district courts to review would result
in "sacrifice" of legal rights, the same class as that to which such cases as
Hotel Employees and International Union appear to belong, the same approach
to the definition of "illegality" ought to be available in all.
Another pertinent fact that is apparent from these cases is that the sub-
stantiality of damage is not a significant element in determining whether or not
district court review is available. Although substantial injury might readily
be spelled out in both the Hotel Employees and International Union cases,
such was certainly not the case in Kyne. The presence of nine non-professionals,
holding quasi-professional jobs,94 in a unit of 233 professionals, was at best a
technical legal error without substantial injury, district court review of which
was all the more unjustified since section 10 review would be available to the
same extent as in the case of an allegedly mistaken finding of fact within an
area of initial Board discretion.
The result seems to be a much more liberal treatment of judicial review
than was contemplated when the labor statutes were first enacted. The Switch-
men's decision undoubtedly retains its vigor to the extent that district court
review will not be accorded solely because of an erroneous finding of fact by the
Board, the appropriateness of a unit determination not involving statutory pro-
hibitions, for example. However, it appears that the Board is no longer effec-
tively insulated from district court review when allegedly erroneous findings
of law are concerned; at least, there are no clear standards defined which can
separate those questions of law initially reviewable by the district courts and
those which must await an unfair labor practice finding under the Taft-Hartley
Act or an enforcement injunction proceeding under the Railway Labor Act.
The result must necessarily be the frequent interjection of delay, as and if
desired by a litigating party.
Conclusion
The present Supreme Court position seems to accord with the view of
Jaffe that the courts apply a presumption favoring reviewability in the absence
of dominant considerations to the contrary. 5 He interprets Switchmen's itself
93. Statements in the "legislative history" of the Taft-Hartley Act indicate congres-
sional concern for professional employees who were swallowed up in units of predominantly
non-professional employees. Note, for example, S.R.Doc. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1947), 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TE LABOR MANAGEM ENT RELATIONS ACT 417 (1947):
"Since their [professional employees] number is always small in comparison with produc-
tion or clerical employees, collective agreements seldom reflect their desires." See also
H.R.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1947), 1 LEGISLATnW HISTORY 540 (conference
report).
94. Supra note 61.
95. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review 1, supra note 8, at 420.
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as an unjustified deviation from this judicial attitude, inspired by an over-
exuberance of the period traceable to the New Deal 96 Whether the Kyne
decision is viewed as a correction of an historical aberration, as a result (which
it does not purport to be) dictated by a changed public policy gleaned from
the Administrative Procedure Act,97 or as simply a natural result of the frailty
of the judiciary overzealously guarding its function as the final arbiter of legal
disputes, it is not simply a different situation calling for different results. It
should, in the future, require fundamentally different approaches than have
been utilized in the past. Given reasonably close questions of law, the injunc-
tion proceeding may well be, in practical effect, a necessary step in the certifica-
tion process.
WLLAm H. GAmiDNER
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON FOREIGN DIVORCES: PROOF OF THE
FOREIGN LAW
The expanding industrial complex of the United States and the rapidly
growing mobility of its population, fostered by improvements in the fields of
transportation and communication, have led to increasing limitations on the
traditional independence of the state in areas heretofore considered local in
nature. The Supreme Court, recognizing the need for developing the state court
systems into an integrated judicial framework, has utilized the Full Faith and
Credit Clause as one means of reaching that objective.1
These efforts were bound to raise new problems. Certainly one of the
most sacrosanct local areas is marriage and divorce; local policy governs these
institutions with zeal, and infringements by federal law naturally result in a
great deal of controversy. The advent of the "divorce mill state" created new
resentments which inevitably led to a tenacious grasping of divergent views.
An early attempt to gain order out of the chaos and to adjust the conflicting
interests of the states was doomed to failure.2
The controversy is largely focused on the problem of a sister state's obliga-
tion to enforce the decree of the divorcing state. Since jurisdiction, or power,
is a necessary prerequisite to the giving of full faith and credit to any decree or
judgment, the states searched this area for a weakness upon the basis of which
96. "This decision is in some measure, I believe, an expression of the mood of judicial
self-deprecation and abdication into which the Court of that period had fallen. Haunted
by a past of judicial arrogance, beguiled by the promise of administrative action, a majority
of the judges who participated were easily persuaded of the irrelevance of the judicial role."
Id. at 430.
97. Air Line Dispatchers Association v. National Mediation Board, 189 F.2d 685
(D.C.Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951). See supra note 25.
1. EmEzwzso, CoNczmrs oF LAWS, part one, p. 17.
2. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 26 Sup.Ct. 525 (1906).
